What this domain covers#
The sixth domain asks the declarant to make public the essential information about the capital structure and the governance that actually controls the company: shareholders holding more than 5% of the capital, nationality of the reference shareholders, possible presence of foreign funds (in particular American, British, Chinese, Gulf), submission to the national foreign-investment screening mechanism (Investissements étrangers en France for France, AWG for Germany, Golden Power for Italy, national equivalents elsewhere), statutory protective provisions in the event of an attempted non-EU acquisition.
The domain is deliberately honest about its own limit: this information can evolve rapidly. A French company today may be acquired tomorrow by a non-European actor and change its sovereignty profile from one day to the next, without any existing contractual protection generally offering the client recourse. Domain 6 is precisely what makes that risk visible.
Why this domain matters#
Thesis 12 of the manifesto particularly targets European providers: “as long as European providers position themselves as distributors of bricks under foreign governance, they deprive sovereign alternatives of the clients, the capital and the critical mass that would allow them to exist.” This thesis applies at several levels. At the level of the distributed components (covered by domain 1). At the level of the chosen hosting (covered by domain 4). And at the capital level of the provider itself, which is the object of domain 6.
The recent history of the European software landscape is marked by a series of capital events that have changed the sovereignty nature of providers presented as European. SUSE has become approximately 79% owned by EQT Private Equity, a Swedish fund, since November 2023. MariaDB came under the complete control of K1 Investment Management (Manhattan Beach, California) in September 2024 — the company has de facto left the European quadrant despite its legal headquarters in Dublin. Aleph Alpha was acquired by Cohere (Canada) in April 2026. With each event, European clients who had chosen the provider partly for its sovereignty discover that this characteristic has disappeared without notice or recourse.
For a provider, declaring publicly the capital structure and the existing statutory protections is a demonstration of seriousness. For providers that can invoke protective provisions (public golden share, statutory veto right, IEF submission), it is a concrete argument. For those that cannot, the honesty of domain 6 is itself a signal of reliability, in line with the general spirit of the Profile.
What is asked, by category of declarant#
For all categories. List of shareholders holding more than 5% of the capital or voting rights. Nationality of each significant shareholder (ultimate controlling entity). Presence or absence of investors based outside the EU. Submission of the provider to the national foreign-investment screening regime, with specification of the perimeter (the IEF submission in France covers certain sectors and beyond certain thresholds). Possible statutory protective provisions: anti-takeover clauses, veto rights, specific State share, prior approval of new investors. Significant bond or convertible debt that could lead to a change of control.
Specificity for publishers backed by an open source project. Mention of any separation between the commercial entity and the foundation that governs the project. An independent foundation brings a layer of protection: even if the commercial entity changes owner, the open source project remains under distinct governance.
Specificity for distributors and integrators. Beyond the own capital, mention of the original publishers of the distributed solutions, whose nationality and effective control determine the actual sovereignty of the offer proposed to clients.
An example of an honest, well-done answer#
A French SaaS scale-up of 90 staff declares its domain 6 as follows. Capital held 42% by the founders (two natural persons of French nationality), 31% by a French growth-stage VC fund (itself controlled by predominantly European LPs, the composition of which is partially public), 18% by a pan-European VC fund, 6% by employees through a profit-sharing plan, 3% by BPI France. No investor based outside the EU in the current cap table. Submission to the IEF (Investissements étrangers en France) on future operations, the company having been classified in a sensitive sector following a public investment. Shareholders’ agreement including a pre-emption right in the event of a transfer to a non-EU entity and a veto right for BPI France on significant capital operations. No convertible debt outstanding.
An anti-pattern to avoid#
A domain 6 left empty or reduced to “company under French law based in Paris” sidesteps the stake, which is not the legal headquarters but the effective control. A formal declaration (“we are a European company”) without capital detail says nothing about real sovereignty. A concealment of significant foreign investors under the pretext of commercial confidentiality is in practice difficult to maintain because substantial capital structures typically leave public traces (corporate filings, fundraising press releases). It is better to declare honestly.
Articulation with the other domains and commitments#
Domain 6 largely conditions domain 4 (the effective jurisdiction of a hosting provider depends on who actually controls it) and feeds into domain 7 (anticipated capital evolutions, such as a planned fundraising, must be declared there). It is also the passage point that distinguishes a genuinely European provider from a provider with a European appearance but structurally controlled outside the EU. For investors and funders, the commitment fund-001-sovereignty-criteria-due-diligence relies largely on the information that the companies in their portfolio declare in their domain 6.
How to fill in the form#
The objective is not the capital exhaustiveness of an INPI document, but readability sufficient for a client to identify who effectively controls your company.
Shareholders above 5% of the capital#
For each significant shareholder (indicative threshold of 5%, to be adjusted to your structure):
- Name: legal name or name of the natural person.
- Type: Natural person, Fund, Company, Foundation, Public entity. This qualifier changes the reading (a US fund does not have the same scope as a Dutch foundation).
- Jurisdiction: country under whose law the shareholder operates (FR, US, DE, NL…). For a fund, indicate the jurisdiction of the holding vehicle (often different from the firm’s country of origin).
- Approximate percentage: an order of magnitude is enough. A bracket (“~12%”) is worth more than nothing.
- Comment: useful clarifications (voting shares different from capital shares, veto rights, golden share, etc.).
Overview#
- Jurisdiction of the reference shareholders: free synthesis. Example: “70% of the votes held by French shareholders, 25% by a Dutch fund, 5% by employees through an FCPE.”
- Public source (URL): corporate register, “investors” page on the site, registration document, fundraising press release. Allows verification.
- Chain of ownership up to the ultimate parent: trace the capital chain up to the entity that in fine effectively controls (in the sense of corporate law: cumulative 50% threshold, or de facto control). This is often where an unexpected non-EU dependency reveals itself.
- Recent capital developments: fundraisings of the last 24 months, exit of shareholders, ongoing transactions.
Foreign-investment screening regime#
Relevant for companies classified as strategic.
- Applicable?: Yes / No / Not communicated. No if you are not in an activity targeted by a screening regime (IEF in France, AWG in Germany, Golden Power in Italy, CFIUS in the US…).
- Regime: name of the applicable regime (IEF, AWG, Golden Power…).
- Comment: has it already been activated? Must new non-EU shareholders notify?
Statutory protection against a non-EU acquisition#
- Statutory protection against a non-EU acquisition: ternary. Have you formalised in your statutes a blocking mechanism (golden share of a European reference shareholder, cap on holdings by a non-EU shareholder, veto right of a sovereign fund, etc.)? If so, the comment describes the mechanism and the source identifies it publicly.